On 31 May 1974, Syria and Israel, with international efforts led by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, signed the Disengagement Agreement following the Tishreen War. This agreement drew two vertical lines along the Golan Heights from north to south, prohibiting any forces from either side from occupying this area. The distance between these lines varies, spanning more than seven kilometres in the Quneitra region and less than five hundred metres near the Yarmouk River in the south. Around 1,200 international troops are stationed here, with the mandate to monitor the agreement’s implementation, particularly along the eastern border, known as Line B, and the western border, Line A, marked by a blue line.
The Syrian regime accepted Kissinger’s ‘solution’ whereby Israel would allow the Syrian flag to be raised over part of Quneitra, while Syria accepted the establishment of a ‘blue line’, beyond which lay the entire Golan Heights under Israeli control. The significance of this line was reinforced in 1981 when Israel annexed the Golan Heights, a move unrecognized by the international community. Although this decision did not alter the military landscape, it became one of the United Nations’ most enduring agreements, upheld by both sides for nearly 50 years. Now, however, Israel appears ready to reconsider this status quo.
Additional momentum?
Israel seems to be seeking fundamental geographical changes along its borders with Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and possibly the West Bank. Despite decades of security along the Syrian border, Israel now aims to leverage both the international political climate and local military conditions to impose new boundaries. After extending its reach in Gaza and achieving victories over Hezbollah in Lebanon by pushing it beyond the Litani River, Israel now seeks to construct fortified defensive lines on the Syrian side. Israel views Syria as Hezbollah’s sole remaining supply route, and by cutting this ‘lifeline’, Israel hopes to weaken the group further, having already exerted significant pressure on Hezbollah’s southern Lebanon stronghold. Today, Israel believes it can carry out these changes with minimal international objection. While the United Nations voices concern over Israel’s actions, Israel counters with security justifications, particularly in light of the 7 October attacks. With a figure like Trump in the White House, this proposed border realignment could solidify as another political fait accompli, benefiting Netanyahu at Syria’s expense.
This strategy not only reveals the Syrian regime’s weakness but also highlights Iran’s vulnerability. Iran has long sought to establish a foothold in the south adjacent to Israel but has been thwarted by Israel’s reach, which has even extended into Tehran. Russia, with its regional presence and former role in sponsoring agreements between the Syrian regime and local southern factions, appears either weakened or disengaged, as Israel’s current incursions unfold under its watch.
Israeli actions in southern Syria could gain additional momentum with the Trump administration, whose first term saw unprecedented support for Israel and significant advancements in Arab-Israeli relations. This momentum may be reinforced by Russia’s desire for calm on other fronts and Iran’s weakened position, which requires time to heal its wounds and seek channels for dialogue with Trump, possibly through southern Syria.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
The post Southern Syria in Israel’s Calculations first appeared on The Syrian Observer.