More than a decade since Russian lawmakers banned “LGBTQ+ propaganda,” the Kremlin’s self-declared crusade for “traditional values” has found a new target — Russians who don’t want children.
On Nov. 12, the Russian State Duma voted to criminalize the support and promotion of “childfree propaganda,” effectively imposing fines on those who publicly express such views.
Once approved by the upper house of the country’s parliament and signed into force by Russian President Vladimir Putin, individuals can be fined around $4,000; state officials will see a $8,000 fine, while the fine for businesses can hit up to around $50,000 and get the company’s license revoked for 90 days.
Being vague in its interpretation, the legislation could be used to target advertising or selling of contraceptives and further restrict abortion rights. A last minute exception was made in the law for those who have chosen to remain celebate for religious reasons, such as monks, at the request of the Russian Orthodox Church.
The term “childfree” describes adults who have consciously decided not to have children, rather than those who may not be able to give birth. While it first hit the feminist mainstream in the 1970s, interest in the term has grown in recent years as more young women discuss their own complex decisions on child-rearing online.
That, according to Russian officials, is a threat — both to Russia’s social fabric and its already plummeting birth rate. In June 2024, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Irina Yarovaya equated being childfree with a weapon “aimed at Russia’s younger generations.”
“When we talk about protecting life, law enforcement officers know what to do. If you have a person with a weapon in their hands, they act as decisively as possible,” she told visitors at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum. “So how should we act here when we are also dealing with weapons that are aimed at younger generations?”
On the surface, the law may seem superfluous. There is no wave of childfree activism in Russia and no organizations advocating for the rights of adults without children. The law is also unlikely to affect Russia’s sluggish demographics: couples who wish to have children often have more pressing concerns, such as the country’s uncertain economic and political scene.
“The law is striking in the sense that it seems so completely unnecessary; it seems like a response to something that doesn’t really exist,” says Dr. Valerie Sperling, professor of political science at Clark University in Massachusetts.
“For people who want to have children, it’s not like a post from someone who says they don’t want to have kids, or even a post saying that other people shouldn’t have kids, is going to change their mind.”
But such laws do have benefits for the Russian government — both at home and on the global stage.
Patriotism and conformity
Russia’s declining birth rate has been a key concern for the Kremlin since the 2000s. In many ways, the move to ban “childfree propaganda” is the latest in the long line of pro-natalist policies, which range from the practical — such as providing cash payments to families following their children’s birth — to the repressive, such as limiting abortion rights.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, has sent this long-standing policy into overdrive. State messaging on the importance of childbearing has become increasingly aggressive in recent years, says Sperling. In a speech to mark Women’s Day in March 2024, Putin described motherhood as women’s greatest gift and a “glorious mission.”
A year prior, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Putin and Russian Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, over the deportation of Ukrainian children from Russian occupiead parts of the country.
Putin previously praised Lvova-Belova for her work overseeing the deportation of Ukrainian children, portraying it as a so-called “humanitarian effort” to “protect Russian citizens.”
Lvova-Belova claimed that 700,000 Ukrainian children have been brought to Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion.
One factor of the Russian state now going against the local population unwilling to have children is rooted in how society’s image of patriotism meets with gender roles.
If men are pushed to show national pride during wartime by enlisting, women are similarly expected to show their devotion by raising children loyal to the state. “The reason that pro-natalism is highlighted during wartime is because women’s status as mothers is what lends them their patriotism. Women are supposed to be dedicated to the cause by raising future soldiers and supporting whatever wars the state engages in,” Sperling says.
But it also reflects how Russian society has become increasingly repressive. Pro-natalist laws can also be used to punish or pressure those who do not conform to the state’s narrow vision of what a family should be. Russian lawyers have already raised concerns that the “childfree propaganda” bill is vaguely worded and could be interpreted to stifle conversations on anything from abortion to birth control.
It could also become an additional legal tool for the Russian security services to punish those who stand against Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine — particularly feminist activists who have become a key part of Russia’s small anti-war resistance.
“Targeting feminists is one of the presidential administration’s main goals, as they know that women’s protests are currently the strongest and most powerful force within the country,” says feminist activist Ira Heuvelman.
On a practical level, she worries that the law will impede sex education for teenagers, resulting in a rise in unwanted pregnancies and illegal abortions. But she also believes that the law could be used to target any woman without children who is involved in opposition activity.
“Pregnant women or those with children are less likely to have the power to resist (the government), given the many economic and social pressures they face,” she says. “They will likely find some high-profile cases and imprison individuals to scare others. Even though “child-free propaganda” only exists in the minds of the presidential administration, they will manage to fabricate cases and bring them to trial, making the process as public as possible.”
A global signal
Such laws, however, are not purely domestic tools. As with the ongoing persecution of the LGBTQ+, legislating against “childfree propaganda” is being marketed by the Kremlin as part of a global struggle for socially conservative values.
When discussing the law at the end of September, Vyacheslav Volodin, the speaker of Russia’s lower house of parliament, told journalists that childfree ideology was being promoted by the United States. “Our country is vast and their (U.S.) ideology is dangerous. Under no circumstances should it be allowed to spread,” he said.
For the Kremlin, the image of Moscow as a conservative bastion against a degenerating “liberal West” is a vital soft power tool, says Dr. Jenny Mathers, senior lecturer in the International Politics Department at the University of Aberystwyth. It portrays Russia as an ally of countries and leaders that share similarly conservative, often oppressive social tastes.
“There are some key countries, especially in the global south, where this message of ‘traditional values’ really seems to resonate,” says Mathers. “It serves a foreign policy purpose. It’s one way of creating a more positive image of Russia in the wider world, at least for some.”
Socially conservative rhetoric and policies have helped Russia find common ground with countries with whom it may otherwise have little in common. These emotive topics can also be used to stress resentment towards the West. “They tap into the shared sense of yes, we too are feeling oppressed by the West and their demands that we should give rights to LGBTQ+ people and so on,” says Mathers. “It makes some communities in the international arena more sympathetic towards Russia, more willing to listen to what Russia has to say.”
Once they have that sympathetic ear, Moscow can also use that opening to gain support for its own goals. The conservative rhetoric to which the “childfree propaganda” bill belongs does not just provide an identity for Russia on the global stage — it is also a platform that can be used and twisted to justify the country’s invasion of Ukraine.
Russian officials have repeatedly spoken of the need to “save” Ukraine from liberal Western values by bringing it back under Russian control.
When Putin announced the start of the full-scale invasion in a televised address on Feb. 24, 2022, he decried a West that “sought to destroy our traditional values and force on us their false values … attitudes that are directly leading to degradation and degeneration, because they are contrary to human nature.”
Days later, the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, insinuated to worshippers that Russia was protecting Ukraine’s Donbas region, consisting of partly occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, from Western governments angry that the region did not want to hold a pride parade.
“It’s this idea of Western deviance versus Russian purity and morality,” says Sperling.
“The implication is that Russia was obliged to invade Ukraine to prevent the irrational, immoral, perverse Western incursions on Russia that would take place if Ukraine remained an independent state. That is where it all ties together.”